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NOTES

The Roles of Precaution and Political
Accountability in the Regulation of
Polybrominated Diphenyl Ethers
ABSTRACT

The differing approachesused in the United States and the
European Union to regulate toxic chemicals have been
highlighted by debates about a group of chemicals called
polybrominated diphenyl ethers, or PBDEs. PBDEs act as
flame-retardants and are added to consumer products to
increase their safety. Questions about the continued use of
PBDEs have been raised, however, because of concerns that
PBDEs may be dangerous to human health and the
environment. The European Union has decided to ban two types
of PBDEs, while the United States has not issued similar
restrictions. In this Note, the Author argues that neither
decision is inherently correct or incorrect because deciding how
much risk is acceptable is a policy decision. Consequently, the
"right"decision is the one that reflects the will of the people who
will benefit from, or bear the costs of, acting now versus waiting
until later. This Note argues, however, that the United States
should align its policy with that of the internationalcommunity
by taking a more precautionaryapproach because PBDEs used
in the United States cause harm outside its borders.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The use of chemicals in the modern industrial world is
metnoxycinnamate,
Ethyl
vinyl
acetate,
octyl
widespread.
thiosulfate-attempting to pronounce the components of most
products is a tongue twister in any language. Often these chemicals
make the products consumers use better and their lives easier. Ethyl
shock
in
running
shoes,
octyl
vinyl
acetate
absorbs
metnoxycinnamate is an active ingredient in sunscreen, and
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thiosulfate is used to develop photos.1 Occasionally, however, the use
of these chemicals has unanticipated consequences and creates
dangers for human health and the environment. Unfortunately,
questions about the safety of these chemicals generally are not raised
until they have been in use for many years, and by that time the
benefits of continued use must be weighed against the costs of
potential harm.
The difficulties posed by these questions are exemplified by
recent debates over a group of chemicals called polybrominated
diphenyl ethers (PBDEs). PBDEs have been used for several years
and benefit the public by reducing the risk of fire. 2 Recent studies
indicate
that PBDEs are appearing at increasingly high
concentrations in humans and might have the potential to cause
serious harm.3 As is often the case, however, there are more questions
about PBDEs than there are definitive answers. The European Union
has decided to ban two forms of PBDEs and restrict the use of a third,
but the United States has not taken similar action at a national
level. 4 This divergence has led to much debate over who is right-the
EU for acting in a precautionary manner or the United States for
5
requiring more scientific evidence before taking formal action.
Deciding what action to take in this type of situation, where so
much is unknown, requires a determination of how much risk is
acceptable. Every day, people evaluate risks and adjust their
behavior accordingly. Some drivers meticulously follow the speed
limit while others are willing to drive faster and risk getting a
speeding ticket. Some investors are willing to invest in high-risk
stocks that have the potential for a substantial return while others
prefer the security of low-risk mutual funds. Any one of these
decisions is not right or wrong per se, but rather a personal decision
based on how much risk a person is willing to tolerate in
consideration of the anticipated costs and benefits. Similarly, at the
national regulatory level deciding how much risk is acceptable is a
policy judgment, and there is no intrinsically correct answer. With
respect to PBDEs, the "right" approach is the one that reflects the
will of the people who will benefit from, or bear the costs of, acting
now or waiting until later.

1.
The Chemical Industry, Chemicals in Sport and Leisure, available at
http://www.chemical-industry.org.uk (last visited Feb. 8, 2005).
2.
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services: Agency For Toxic
Substances and Disease Registry, ToxFAQs: Polybrominated Biphenyls and
Polybrominated Diphenyl Ethers, available at http://atsdr.cdc.gov/tfacts08.html (last
visited Feb. 28, 2005) [hereinafter DHHS].
See, e.g., Frank Rahman et al., Polybrominated Diphenyl Ether (PBDE)
3.
Flame Retardants,Sci. TOTAL ENV'T., July 25, 2001, at 3.
See infra Part II.C.
4.
5.
See infra Part II.A.
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Risk taking in driving and making investments affects, almost
exclusively, the person who makes that decision. In contrast,
decisions made by the European Union and the United States about
PBDEs have a significant effect on people outside their respective
borders. PBDEs belong to a category of pollutants called persistent
organic pollutants (POPs), a defining characteristic of which is the
ability to travel long distances. 6 As a result, the costs of PBDEs
produced or used in the EU and the United States will be borne, at
least in part, by people in other countries who were not involved in
the decision-making process. Many countries, following the lead of
the EU, are enacting formal restrictions and bans on various forms of
PBDEs. 7 This Note will argue that, given the global trend toward
restrictions on PBDEs and the externalities caused by the continued
use of PBDEs in the United States, the United States should respect
the will of the international community and take a more
precautionary approach to PBDEs. The United States will be unable
to do so effectively, however, unless it amends its domestic legislation
governing the regulation of toxic chemicals, the Toxic Substances
Control Act, and ratifies and implements the Stockholm Convention
on Persistent Organic Pollutants in its entirety. Part II of this Note
discusses the history of PBDEs. Part III outlines the use of
precaution as a basis for action in international agreements. Part IV
compares the different approaches used by the European Union and
the United States to regulate toxic chemicals. Part V analyzes the
consequences of those approaches on PBDEs in light of evidence of
PBDE exposure levels in the EU and United States and the possible
effects of PBDEs. Finally, Part VI suggests a course of action for the
United States based on principles of public choice and political
accountability.

II. OVERVIEW: HISTORY OF PBDEs
Polybrominated diphenyl ethers (PBDEs) belong to a group of
chemicals known as brominated flame retardants.8 PBDEs are used
in industrial manufacturing processes because of their flameretardant qualities, increasing the safety of the products to which

Kim Hooper & Jianwen She, Lessons from the Polybrominated Diphenyl
6.
Ethers (PBDEs), 111 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 109, 110 (2003); U.S. Environmental

Protection Agency, Persistent Organic Pollutants: A Global Issue, A Global Response
(Apr. 2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/internationa/toxics/pop.pdf (last visited
Feb. 28, 2005) [hereinafter EPA, POPs].
SONYA LUNDER & RENEE SHARP, Mothers' Milk, ENVTL. WORKING GROUP,
7.
at 12 (2002).
8.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Polybrgminated Diphenyl Ethers
(PBDEs), available at http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/dfe/projects/flameret/pbde.htm (last
updated Dec. 1, 2004) [hereinafter EPA, PBDEs].
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they are added. 9 There are numerous different congeners, or forms, of
PBDEs that differ based on the number and position of bromine
atoms in each molecule. 10 The three congeners most commonly used
in industrial processes are penta-BDE (hereinafter, Penta), octa-BDE
(hereinafter, Octa), and deca-BDE (hereinafter, Deca), containing
five, eight, or ten bromine atoms, respectively. 1 ' The production and
use of PBDEs has increased exponentially since the 1970s, and the
production of Penta nearly doubled during the 1990s. 1 2 By the mid1990s it was estimated that approximately 40,000 tons of PBDEs
were used globally each year. 13 Deca is used in the greatest quantity,
followed by Octa, and lastly Penta. 14 As of 2001, the United States
was responsible for almost fifty percent of the PBDE use worldwide,
while Europe was responsible for approximately twelve percent. 15
PBDEs are used in a variety of materials including plastics,
textiles, and polyurethane foam. 16 These materials are then
incorporated into numerous consumer products that are found in the
majority of U.S. homes, such as home furniture, carpeting,
computers, televisions, carpets, hair dryers, copy machines, and
smoke detectors.' 7 The amount of PBDEs added to these products
varies but can reach as much as thirty percent of the product's
weight.18
Of increasing concern to many is not only the quantity of PBDEs
used in these products but also how the chemicals are used. Flame
retardants used in commercial products can be placed in two broad
categories: reactive chemicals and additive chemicals. 19 The
important difference between these two categories is the stability of
the chemical flame retardant in the finished product. When reactive
chemicals are used as flame retardants, chemical bonds form between
the flame retardant and the consumer good during the manufacturing
process, and the finished product is relatively stable. 20 In contrast,
when additive chemicals are used as flame retardants they are simply

9.
10.
11.

Id.
Rahman et al., supra note 3, at 2.
Id. at3.

12.

LUNDER & SHARP, supra note 7, at 9.

13.
Rahman et al., supra note 3, at 3.
14.
Id. Of the estimated 40,000 tons used annually by the mid-1990s, 30,000
tons were Deca, 6000 tons were Octa, and 4000 tons were Penta. Id.
15.
Linda S. Birnbaum & Daniele F. Staskai, Brominated Flame Retardants:
Cause for Concern?, 112 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 10 (2004). According to the numbers

provided in Table 1, 67,440 metric tons of PBDEs were used worldwide. The Americas
used 33,100 metric tons (or 49.08%) while Europe used 8,360 metric tons (or 12.40%).

Id.
16.

EPA, PBDEs, supra note 6.

17.

LUNDER & SHARP, supra note 7, at 10.

18.
19.
20.

Id. at 9.
Rahman et al., supra note 3, at 2.
Id.
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mixed into the product; chemical bonds are not formed between the
flame retardant and the finished product. 2 1 Because additive flame
retardants such as PBDEs are not chemically bound to the final
product, they are less stable than reactive flame retardants and more
22
likely to leach into the surrounding environment.
A. A Necessary Risk?
It would be easy to argue that PBDEs should be eliminated
completely and immediately if they did not provide a significant
public benefit. PBDEs create a difficult regulatory issue because
although they are potentially harmful to human health and the
environment, they also benefit the public by reducing the risk of fire
in the products to which they are added. 23 Reducing the number of
fires that occur not only saves lives but also creates indirect benefits
to human health and the environment by reducing the amount of
toxic chemicals released during fires. 24 Companies that use PBDEs in
the manufacturing process are, of course, quick to point out the
benefits of using these chemicals and argue that the benefits
outweigh the risks. 25 Concerned activists agree that fire prevention is
an important social goal, but argue it can be achieved without the use
of potentially
dangerous
chemicals. 26
For
example,
the
Environmental Working Group (EWG), a U.S.-based public interest
group composed of scientists, engineers, policy analysts, and lawyers,
advocates numerous alternatives to PBDEs. Such alternatives
include the use of less toxic flame retardants, changes in product
design to make goods inherently less flammable, and even simple
changes in the production of cigarettes, which are responsible for
starting many fires. 27 Moreover, the U.S. Consumer Products Safety
Commission has reported that the safety standards required of
furniture sold in California (which are among the most stringent in
the world) can be achieved without the addition of chemical flame
retardants, and activists argue that protection from fire does not
28
require exposure to persistent organic pollutants such as PBDEs.

21.
Id.
22.
Id.
23.
See Birnbaum & Staskai, supra note 15, at 9.
24.
Id.
25.
See, e.g., Statement of European Brominated Flame Retardant Industry
Panel (June 7, 2002), available at http://www.ebfrip.org/mission.html (last visited Feb.
8, 2005).
26.
See, e.g., LUNDER & SHARP, supra note 7, at 6.
27.
Id. at 37-39.
28.
Id. at 12.
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B. The Dangers of Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs)
PBDEs belong to a category of chemicals called Persistent
Organic Pollutants (POPs). 29 POPs are problematic because of four
shared characteristics.3 0 First, studies have shown POPs to be highly
toxic, linking them to a wide range of adverse effects on health and
the environment.3 1 In humans, exposure to POPs has been linked to a
range of reproductive, developmental, and behavioral problems as
well as impaired functioning of the nervous, endocrine, and immune
systems.3 2 Second, POPs are persistent, meaning that they remain in
the environment for a long time once they are introduced and thus
break down very slowly.3 3 Third, POPs are easily absorbed by the
fatty tissue of living beings.3 4 As a result POPs bioaccumulate,
becoming more concentrated in organisms at the top of the food chain,
such as humans.3 5 Finally, POPs are capable of long-range transport
within and across national boundaries by air, water, and migratory
species.3 6 As a result, POPs generated in one country have the
potential to affect the citizens and environments of foreign countries
37
adversely, and are thus considered a global problem.
Global concern over POPs led to the passage of the Stockholm
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants in May 2001.38 By May
39
2002, only one year later, there were 151 signatories to the treaty.
On February 17, 2004, France became the fiftieth participant to ratify
the Stockholm Convention. 40 As provided for by Article 26 of the
Stockholm Convention, the treaty entered into force on May 17, 2004,
ninety days after ratification by the fiftieth participant. 4 1 An
additional forty-four countries ratified or accepted the Stockholm
Convention in the year following France's ratification, raising the
total number of parties to ninety-four, nearly two-thirds of the

29.
Hooper & She, supra note 6, at 109.
30.
Id. at 5.
31.
Id.
32.
EPA, POPs, supra note 6, at 6.
33.
Id. at 3.
34.
Id.
35.
Id.
36.
Id.
37.
Id.
38.
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, May 17, 2004, 40
I.L.M. 532 [hereinafter Stockholm Convention]
39.
Stockholm Convention Participant List, available at http://www.pops.int
documents/signature/signstatus.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2005).
40.
Id.
41.
Stockholm Convention, supra note 38, at art. 26 § 1 ("This Convention shall
enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date of deposit of the fiftieth instrument
of ratification acceptance, approval, or accession.").
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signatories. 42 The United States has not yet ratified the Stockholm
Convention and is therefore not obligated to comply with its
43
provisions.
Parties to the Stockholm Convention have agreed to reduce or
eliminate the production, use, and release of the twelve most
concerning POPs, known as the "Dirty Dozen."'44 Many of the
chemicals listed in the Dirty Dozen are no longer produced in the
United States and have not been for several years. 45 Two of these
chemicals, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and dichlorodiphenyl
trichloroethane (DDT), have been banned altogether in the United
States since the 1970s; Congress statutorily banned the use of PCBs
in 1976 through the enactment of the Toxic Substances Control Act
(TSCA), while the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) banned the use of DDT, a pesticide, in 1972 when it cancelled
its registration under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). 46 The International Agency for Research on
Cancer has classified PCBs as a probable human carcinogen and DDT
as a possible human carcinogen. 4 7 What concerns many researchers is
that the chemical structure of PBDEs is similar to that of PCBs and
DDT. 48 Because PBDEs are structurally similar to these banned
chemicals, their chemical properties and distribution in the
49
environment also show similarities.
The goals of the Stockholm Convention are not limited to the
restriction or elimination of the Dirty Dozen chemicals, as an
additional purpose is to identify and target additional POPs for
action. 50 The Stockholm Convention establishes a POPs Review
Committee whose functions include reviewing proposals by parties to
list additional POPs in the form of an amendment.5 1 Given the

42.
Stockholm Convention Participant List, supra note 39 (as of February 2005,
the list has 94 Parties).
43.
Id.
44.
Stockholm Convention, supra note 38, at Annexes A-B. The "Dirty Dozen"
consists of the following chemicals: aldrin, chlordane, dichlorodiphenyl trichloroethane
(DDT), dieldrin, endrin, heptachlor, hexachlorobenze, mirex, polychlorinated biphenyls
(dioxins),
and
polychlorinated
dibenzo-p-dioxins
(PCBs),
polychlorinzated
dibenzofurans (furans). EPA, POPs, supra note 6, at 18-19.
45.
EPA, POPs, supra note 6, at 3.
46.
See 15 USC. § 2605(e) 2005 (provision banning PCBs). Information on EPA's
cancellation of DDT's pesticide registration under FIFRA is available at http://www.epa.gov
opptintr/pbttddt.htm8 (last visited Feb. 28, 2005).
UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, RIDDING THE WORLD OF
47.
POPS: A GUIDE TO THE STOCKHOLM CONVENTION ON PERSISTENT ORGANIC POLLUTANTS

14 (Aug. 2002),

available at http://www.pops.int/documents/guidancefDefault.htm

[hereinafter GUIDE TO THE STOCKHOLM CONVENTION].

48.
Rahman et al., supra note 3, at Abstract (stating that PBDEs are
"structurally similar to PCBs and DD'"').
49.
Id.
50.

GUIDE TO THE STOCKHOLM CONVENTION, supra note 47, at 13.

51.

Id. at 12.
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similarities between PBDEs and chemicals already listed in the Dirty
Dozen, many believe PBDEs will be included in the Stockholm
52
Convention in the near future.
C. Restrictions and Bans on PBDEs
PBDEs have only started receiving coverage from major media
outlets in the United States during the past few years. For example,
PBDEs were first mentioned in the New York Times in 2001, USA
Today in 2002, and the Washington Post in 2003. 53 This might lead
many in the United States to reasonably conclude that concerns over
PBDEs are a fairly recent development. That is not the case,
however. To the contrary, concerns over PBDEs have existed for long
enough that bans were proposed in three European countriesGermany, Sweden, and the Netherlands-as early as the mid1980s. 64 In 1986 industries in Germany agreed to voluntarily phase
PBDEs out of use, and industries in Sweden and the Netherlands
soon did the same.55 Germany officially restricted the use of PBDEs
56
in its 1993 Dioxin Ordinance.
The current legal status of PBDEs varies greatly. In early 2003
the European Union announced its decision to ban two forms of
PBDEs, Penta and Octa.5 7 According to the EU's directive, "In order
to protect health and the environment the placing on the market and
the use of pentaBDE and octaBDE and the placing on the market of
articles containing one or both of these substances should be
prohibited. 5 8 Member States are directed to adopt and implement
the laws, regulations, and provisions necessary to comply with the
ban by August 2004.59 The European Union's general ban does not
apply to Deca, but a second directive passed in early 2003 becomes
effective July 1, 2006 and prohibits the use of all PBDEs, including

52.
See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
53.
Based on Lexis searches of The New York Times, USA Today, and The
Washington Post using the term "PBDE" and finding the earliest article in which that
term appeared. See Laurie Tarkan, Research is Urged for Healthier Breast Milk, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 16, 2001, at F6; see also Charisse Jones, Anxieties Raise over Toxins at
Ground Zero, USA TODAY, Feb. 7, 2002, at 1; see also Associated Press, California
Becomes First State to Ban Flame Retardants,WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 2003, at A02.
54.
LUNDER & SHARP, supra note 7, at 33.
55.
Id.
56.
Id.
57.
Council Directive 2003/11/EC of 6 Feb. 2003, Relating to Restrictions on the
Marketing
and Use of Certain Dangerous Substances and Preparations
(pentabromodiphenyl ether, octabromodiphenyl ether), 2003 O.J. (L 42) 45 [hereinafter
Council Directive 2003/1 I/EC].
58.
Id.
59.
Id.
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Deca, in the majority of electronic equipment.60 China recently
decided to adopt the same policy, announcing a ban on the use of all
PBDEs in electronic equipment effective July 1, 2006.61 The types of

products included in the EU and Chinese measures include electronic
communication products, television products, computers, and home
electronic products.

6

2

In sharp contrast to the European Union bans, federal regulation
of PBDEs in the United States is minimal. Companies that use or
produce large quantities of Deca must file a Toxics Release Inventory
(TRI) Report. 63 A TRI report is only required if a company uses more
than 10,000 pounds or produces more than 25,000 pounds of Deca
annually. 64 An obligation to file a TRI report is strictly a reporting
requirement, however; it does not impose a ceiling on the quantity of
a toxic chemical an industrial firm can use or produce. 65 There are no
other federal regulations relating to PBDEs. 6 6 As a result, not only

are PBDEs not banned in the United States, but there are no
restrictions on the amount used or produced.
Despite this absence of regulation, concern over PBDEs has been
expressed at the federal level. In the fall of 2003, members of the
Committee on Energy and Commerce wrote a letter to the EPA
expressing their concern. 67 The letter also requested the provision of
more information including:
*
"

"

What steps the EPA has taken to better understand how PBDEs
effect human health and the environment;
Whether the EPA is taking steps to expedite the evaluation of
information on PBDEs voluntarily submitted by industries as part
of the Voluntary Children's Chemical Evaluation Program;
Information that the EPA received from several roundtable
discussions on brominated flame retardants in late 2002 and early
2003;

60.
Council Directive 2002/95/EC of 27 Jan. 2003 on the Restriction of the Use
of Certain Hazardous Substances in Electrical and Electronic Equipment, 2003 O.J. (L
37) 19.
61.
SinoCast China Business Daily News, MII Announces Electronic Pollution
Act (Jan. 15, 2004), available on Global News Wire (accessible through Lexis).

62.

See id.

63.

US ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION AGENCY, EMERGENCY PLANNING AND

COMMUNITY RIGHT-TO-KNow SECTION 313 LIST OF TOXIC CHEMICALS (Mar. 2001),
available at http://www.epa.gov/tri. This document lists all chemicals that trigger the
TRI reporting requirement of EPCRA § 313. Deca can be found on the list according to
its CAS registry number (1163-19-5). Penta (CAS no. 32534-81-9) and Octa (CAS no.
32536-52-0) are not on the list. Id.
64.
42 U.S.C. § 11023(f) (2002).
65.
Id.
66.
See LUNDER & SHARP, supra note 7, at 34.
67.
See John D. Dingell, et al., Letter to EPA re: PBDEs (Oct. 21, 2003),
availableat http://www.house.gov/commercedemocrats/press/1081tr64.htm.
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Copies of a letter sent from the EPA to the Centers for Disease
Control recommending PBDEs as a potentially harmful substance
68
that should be biomonitored.

The letter concluded with the statement that "[i]n light of the
scientific evidence that shows PBDEs are doubling in our population
every two to five years, the urgent need for EPA to take immediate
'69
further action to address the potential threat is clear.
Several states have acted at the local level to restrict PBDEs. In
August 2003, California became the first state to enact legislation
banning the manufacture and distribution of Penta and Octa. 70 As
passed, the ban was not scheduled to go into effect until January 1,
2008, but the legislature passed an amendment advancing the
effective date to June 1, 2006.71 Not long thereafter, Maine and New
York both enacted legislation banning the sale of products containing
Penta and Octa, but those bans become effective on January 1, 2006,
almost six months earlier than the California ban. 72 Finally, the
Michigan legislature considered bills banning the use of PBDEs in
73
both the 2002 and 2003 sessions, but the bills have not yet passed.

III. PRECAUTION AS A BASIS FOR ACTION

The PBDE ban in the European Union and the contrasting lack
of regulation in the United States can be explained in part by their
differing views of the precautionary principle, and by how those views
affect the approaches taken by each to the regulation of toxic
chemicals. While the European Union has expressly adopted the
principle and incorporated it into its regulatory approach, the United
States has not. This influences two aspects of chemical regulation in
the EU and the United States: participation in international
agreements governing toxic chemicals and domestic regulation
governing toxic chemicals within their respective borders.
A. The PrecautionaryPrinciple
Debates over whether it is preferable to have a regulatory
system that takes preventive and precautionary action or one that
requires scientific evidence of harm before action have been

68.
Id.
69.
Id.
70.
Maria Cone, Davis Signs Bill to Ban Flame Retardants, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
10, 2003, at pt. 2, p. 6.
71.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 108922 (2004).
72.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1609 (2004); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 370111 (2004).
73.
Lunder & Sharp, supra note 7, at 34.
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longstanding in both Europe and the United States.7 4 There is no
environmental legislation in the United States that expressly adopts
the precautionary principle as a basis for regulation. 75 In contrast,
the treaties that establish the European Union expressly state that
the precautionary principle is to be used as the basis for
76
environmental policy.
The precautionary principle developed out of concerns that all
too often, scientific certainty about cause and effect cannot be
established until it is too late to prevent harm to human health or the
environment. 7 7 Supporters of the precautionary principle argue that
precaution is particularly important in the environmental context
because the harm that results is often irreversible. 78 The most widely
accepted tenet of the precautionary principle is that in Principle 15 of
the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, which states:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall
be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there
are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective
79
measures to prevent environmental degradation.

Critics of the principle argue that it is "unscientific and
protectionist" and allows governments to unreasonably restrict trade
when no risk is present.80 The European Commission's official
statement on the principle states, however, that "[riecourse to the
precautionary principle presupposes that potentially dangerous
effects deriving from a phenomenon, product, or process have been
74.
See, e.g., Jonathan B. Weiner, Whose PrecautionAfter All? A Comment on
the Comparison and Evolution of Risk Regulatory Systems, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L
L. 207, 214-15 (2003). According to Professor Weiner:
Normative evaluations of this situation vary. Some observers see a civilized,
safe, careful Europe confronting a risky, reckless, and violent America. To this
group, the Precautionary Principle is an antidote to industrialization,
globalization, and American risk-taking. On the other hand, other observers
see a fearful, statist, protectionist Europe trying to rise in the post Cold-War
era to challenge a market-based, scientific, entrepreneurial United States. To
this group, the Precautionary Principle is an obstacle to science, trade and
progress.
Id.
Id. at 212.
75.
Id.; see also European Union: Consolidated Version of the Treaty on
76.
European Union and Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community, Jan. 1998, 37 I.L.M. 56, 116-17 (1998).
77.

DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

405 (2d ed. 2002).
Id. at 409.
78.
Id. at 406; Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 14,
79.
1992, princ. 15, 31 I.L.M. 874.
See, e.g., Scientific Alliance, The Debate over Chemicals, available at
80.
http://www.scientific-alliance.org/the-debatechemicals.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2005)
[hereinafter Scientific Alliance].
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identified." 8' That is, as interpreted by the European Commission,
the principle does not justify action in the complete absence of
evidence establishing risk. In addition, the European Commission
also takes the position that action based on the precautionary
principle should be "subject to review, in the light of new scientific
data, and capable of assigning responsibility for producing the
scientific evidence necessary for a more comprehensive risk
assessment. '8 2 It appears, therefore, that the European Commission
does not intend for regulatory action based on the precautionary
principle to be permanent or unsupported by science. Instead, the
purpose of the precautionary principle is to maintain the status quo
until further information is available and before irreversible damage
occurs.
B. The Use of Precautionin InternationalAgreements
The Rio Declaration is not the only international agreement that
emphasizes the importance of precaution in risk regulation. To the
contrary, precaution is a theme emphasized in numerous
international environmental agreements, many of which specifically
refer to the precautionary principle.8 3 Most recently, the
community affirmed its commitment to the
international
precautionary principle in Article 1 of the Stockholm Convention,
which states:
Mindful of the precautionary approach as set forth in Principle 15 of
the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the objective of
this convention is to protect human health and the environment from
84
persistent organic pollutants.

European Commission, Communication from the Commission on the
81.
PrecautionaryPrinciple,reprinted in HUNTER ET AL., supra note 77, at 407.
82.

Id.

See, e.g., Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, art. 3,
83.
31 I.L.M. 849 ("The [p]arties should take precautionary measures to anticipate,
prevent, or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects.");
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and
International Lakes, Mar. 17, 1992, art. 2, 31 I.L.M. 1312 (Parties are to be guided by a
number of principles, including the "precautionary principle, by virtue of which action
to avoid the potential transboundary impact of the release of hazardous substances
shall not be postponed on the ground that scientific research has not fully proved a
causal link ....");Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the
Control of Transboundry Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes Within
Africa, Jan. 29, 1991, art. 4, 30 I.L.M. 773 ("Each [p]arty shall strive to adopt and
...
);
implement the preventive, precautionary approach to pollution problems.
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 ILM 1541
("Parties to this protocol . . . [dietermined to protect the ozone layer by taking
"); see also Carolyn Raffernsperger, Uses of the
precautionary measures ......
PrecautionaryPrinciple in InternationalTreaties and Agreements, Oct. 1999, available
at http://www.biotech-info.net/treaties-and-agreements.html.
Stockholm Convention, supra note 38, at art. 1.
84.
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Recent debates in this country indicate that the failure of the United
States to ratify the Stockholm Convention has been a result of the
Convention's precautionary approach and how that approach governs
85
the addition of new chemicals to the Convention.
As noted earlier, one goal of the Stockholm Convention is to
target additional POPs that require action, and the Convention
establishes a process for adding those new chemicals to the
agreement.8 6 Any party to the Convention can propose the addition of
a new chemical by submitting a report that details evidence of the
chemical's persistence, bio-accumulation, potential for long-range
environmental transport, and adverse effects to human health or the
environment. 8 7 The report also must include a statement indicating
the need for global control of the chemical. 88 Finland has already
prepared such a report for Penta and appears ready to propose its
89
addition to the Convention.
Once a proposal is submitted, a scientific review committee
established by the Convention evaluates the proposal and creates a
risk profile for the chemical. 90 The proposal proceeds if the committee
determines the chemical "is likely . . .to lead to significant adverse
human health and/or environmental effects such that global action is
warranted." 91 The importance of precaution and preventive action in
this process is clear; as the Convention states, "[1]ack of full scientific
certainty shall not prevent the proposal from proceeding. '92 If the
committee determines that the process should proceed, the proposal
is submitted for consideration to the Conference of Parties (COP),
which is composed of representatives from each country that has
ratified the Convention. 93 The precautionary nature of the
Convention is again evident, as the parties are directed to "decide, in
'94
a precautionary manner, whether to list the chemical.
The importance of scientific evidence in this process is also clear,
however. To recommend the addition of a chemical to the Convention,

85.
See, e.g., Pep Fuller & Thomas 0. McGarity, Beyond the Dirty Dozen: The
Bush Administration's Cautious Approach to Listing New PersistentOrganic Pollutants
and the Future of the Stockholm Convention, 28 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 1

(Fall 2003).
86.
Stockholm Convention, supra note 38, at art. 8.
87.
Id. art. 8, annex D.
88.
Id. at annex D.
89.
See JOHANNA PELTOLA & LEENA YLA-MONONEN,
PENTABROMODIPHENYL
ETHER
AS
A
GLOBAL
POP

FINNISH ENV'T INST.,
8-9,
available
at

http://www.greenstart.org/efc9/bfrs/bfrpdfs/BFR 16_PE.pdf (last visited Feb. 25,
2005).
90.
Stockholm Convention, supra note 38, at art. 8.
91.
Id. art. 8(7).
92.
Id.
93.
Stockholm Convention, supra note 38, at art. 8(4)(a); EPA, POPs, supra
note 6, at 13.
94.
Stockholm Convention, supra note 38, at art. 8(9).
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the committee must find, based on a report detailing its adverse
effects, that significant adverse effects are likely. 95 The scientific
report requirement and the inclusion of the words significant and
likely preclude the committee from recommending the addition of a
chemical that merely poses a negligible risk. It is evident that this
process attempts to strike a balance between not acting absent
scientific support and acting before significant irreversible harm
occurs.
This precautionary approach for the listing of additional
chemicals to the Convention has been met with significant resistance
in the United States. For example, although President Bush
submitted proposed legislation for the implementation of the
Stockholm Convention in April 2002, the proposal did not address the
addition of new POPs to the Convention. 96 According to Pep Fuller,
chief EPA negotiator for the Stockholm Convention, and Professor
Thomas McGarity, this omission would have severely limited U.S.
participation in the Stockholm Convention because the legislation
proposed by President Bush required the United States not only to
ratify a Convention amendment but also to amend one of two U.S.
statutes, the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) or the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), every time the
international community decided to list a new POP in the
Convention. 97 Fuller and McGarity conclude that the Bush
Administration appears unwilling to accept recommendations made
by the COP on whether a new chemical should be added, and instead
has taken the position that the United States should not add a
chemical to the Convention unless the proposal passes a quantitative
cost-benefit analysis. 98 The cost-benefit analysis endorsed by the
administration, however, has previously led to significant delays
whenever the EPA has attempted to cancel the registration of
pesticides that are POPs. 9 9 Consequently, it appears that had the
Senate approved the proposed legislation, the practical effect would
have been to limit U.S. participation in the Stockholm Convention to
the original Dirty Dozen.
The precautionary approach for the listing of new chemicals
contained in the Stockholm Convention has, however, received
support in the United States from others outside the Bush
Administration. A competing bill to implement the Convention was
introduced by Senator James M. Jeffords (hereinafter, the Jeffords

Id. art. 8(7).
95.
Fuller & McGarity, supra note 85, at 10-11.
96.
97.
Id. at 11.
98.
Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 4; see also 7 U.S.C. § 136d(b) (2005) (requiring the EPA to establish
99.
that use of a pesticide results in unreasonable adverse effects before cancellation is
possible).
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Bill) at the same time that President Bush submitted his proposed
legislation. 10 0 The Jeffords Bill did not affect the Convention's
requirement that a party ratify an amendment in order to be bound
by it, and it also preserved the ability of the United States to "optout" of any such amendment. 01' The Jeffords Bill eliminated the need
in the President's Bill to amend TSCA or FIFRA if the United States
decided to ratify an amendment to the Convention. 10 2 That is, under
the President's Bill two legislative acts were needed to list a new
POP-ratification of the Convention amendment and an amendment
to either TSCA or FIFRA. In contrast, under the Jeffords Bill only the
former was needed.
Ultimately, neither bill was passed. 10 3 Efforts to ratify and
implement the Stockholm Convention were renewed in light of the
Convention's recent entry-into-force date of May 17, 2004. On
February 25, 2004, proposed legislation was introduced to help the
United States meet its pesticide-related obligations under the
Stockholm Convention and two other international environmental
agreements.' 0 4 The most recent proposal evidences a continued
unwillingness to defer to a decision made by the COP, as the proposal
instructs the EPA to consider the recommendation of the COP, but
the procedure that must be followed to cancel the registration of a
pesticide is otherwise unaltered. 0 5 Requiring the EPA to conduct a
full cancellation process under FIFRA to implement an amendment to
the Convention is problematic because the cancellation process is
considered burdensome and inefficient and is, therefore, rarely
used.' 0 6 The 2002 Jeffords Bill also would have required the EPA to
conduct a cancellation hearing, but it gave the EPA the authority to
do so without first establishing that the pesticide posed an
unreasonable risk. 10 7 "In effect, the Jeffords Bill would have
permitted, but not required, the EPA to effectuate a rebuttable

100.
Fuller & McGarity, supra note 85, at 12.
101.
Id.
102.
Id.
103.
See S.2507, 107th Cong. Bill Summary & Status (May 31, 2002), available
at http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/dl07query.html [hereinafter S.2507 Bill Summary &
Status]; S.211B, 107th Cong. Bill Summary & Status (Apr. 11, 2002), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/d107query.html [hereinafter S.2118 Bill Summary & Status].
104.
PIC and POPs Convention and the LRTAP POPs Protocol Implementation
Act (Feb. 25, 2004) available at http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/fifrafeb25pdf. [hereinafter
Proposed Legislation]. The proposed legislation affects not only U.S. participation in
the Stockholm Convention, but also the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed
Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International
Trade (PIC Convention) and the Protocol on Persistent Organic Pollutants to the 1979
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP POPs Protocol). Id.
105.
See id. at 18 (proposed new FIFRA § 17(7)).
106.
See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
107.
Fuller & McGarity, supra note 85, at 12.
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presumption that a newly listed POP should be regulated." 10 8 As a
result, the Jeffords Bill would have given weight and deference to a
listing decision made by the scientific review committee that is
supported by scientific evidence, but it still would have allowed the
United States to "'opt out' of a 'crazy COP' decision." 109
In addition, it is important to note that the scope of the most
recent proposal is limited to FIFRA, the statute governing
pesticides. 110 The introduction to the Bill states that its purpose is "to
implement pesticide-related obligations of the United States under
the international conventions or protocols known as the PIC
111
Convention, the POPs Convention, and the LRTAP POPs Protocol."
Because the Bill does not propose any amendments to TSCA, the
statute governing toxic chemicals such as PBDEs, it would not enable
the country to meet all of its obligations under these international
agreements. Instead, it would only enable the country. to act in
conjunction with the international community if a pestiide is at
issue. No action has been taken on this proposal, but it dei6nstrates
that the government apparently remains unwilling to consent to
decisions made by the COP and is unlikely to endorse any
amendment expanding the Convention's scope beyond the Dirty
112
Dozen, including a potential amendment to list PBDEs.
Unfortunately, the risks posed by PBDEs are also unlikely to be
adequately reduced or eliminated by the U.S.'s toxic chemical
regulatory system.

IV. APPROACHES

TO THE REGULATION OF

ToxIc

CHEMICALS

The divergence of European Union and United States
environmental policy with respect to the precautionary principle is
also evident in their respective approaches to the regulation of toxic
chemicals within their borders. The chemical regulatory systems in
the EU and the United States share both similarities and differences.
For example, although both systems establish separate frameworks
for new chemicals and for existing chemicals, they differ in precisely
how they regulate these two classes. 113 For new chemicals, the
primary difference between the EU and U.S. systems lies in what the
regimes require of new chemicals before they can be introduced into

108.
Id.
Id. at 13.
109.
Proposed Legislation, supra note 104.
110.
111.
Id. at 1 (emphasis added).
112.
See S.2507 Bill Summary & Status, supra note 103; see S.2118 Bill
Summary & Status, supra note 103; see Fuller & McGarity, supra note 85.
113.
See infra Parts IV.A-B.
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the market. 114 For existing chemicals, the primary difference regards
the circumstances under which a ban or restriction on use is
considered justified.15
A. Regulation of New Chemicals
The EU and U.S. systems both require more of new chemicals
than existing chemicals. 116 The major components of new chemical
1 17
regulation in both systems are notification and risk assessment.
The EU's risk assessment requirement, however, is more extensive
than its counterpart in the United States. 1 8
1. Regulation of New Chemicals in the European Union
In the EU, any chemical first marketed after September 18,
1981, and therefore not listed in the European Inventory of Existing
ChemicalSubstances (EINECS), is classified as a new chemical. 119
Uniform regulation of new chemicals among European countries was
first required with the passage of Directive 79/831/ECC in 1979.120
Although the directive encouraged the testing of new chemicals before
their introduction to the market, it did not impose a mandatory
testing requirement. 121 Instead, the mandatory requirements were
related to notification and labeling. 122 Under the directive, chemical
manufacturers and importers are required to notify the appropriate
government before placing a new chemical on the market and to label
the chemical if they determine it is "dangerous" as defined by the
directive. 123 Even though the directive does not require testing, the
precautionary nature of the European approach is still evident. For

114.
See infra Part V.A.
115.
See infra Part IV.B.
Compare infra Part IV.A, with infra Part IV.B.
116.
See infra Parts IV.A. 1-2.
117.
118.
Compare infra Part IV.A.1, with infra Part V.A.2.
119.
European Chemical Bureau, Existing Chemicals, overview § 2 n.2,
available at http://ecb.jrc.it/existing-chemicals (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
Council Directive 79/831/EEC of 18 September 1979 Amending for the
120.
Sixth Time Directive 67/548/EEC, 1979 O.J. (L 259) 10 [hereinafter Council Directive
79/831/EEC]. Council Directive 67/548/EEC was passed on June 27, 1967 and consists
of laws, regulations, and provisions relating to the classification, packaging, and
labeling of dangerous substances. 1967-68 O.J. SPEc. ED. at 234.
Council Directive 79/831/EEC, supra note 120, at 1 ("In order to control the
121.
effects on man and the environment it is advisable that any new substance placed on
the market be subjected to a prior study by the manufacturer or importer.") (emphasis
added).
122,
Id.
123.
Id. arts. 2(2)(a).(n), 6(1), 16(1) (Substances are considered "dangerous," and
must be labeled accordingly, if they are explosive, oxidizing, extremely flammable,
highly flammable, flammable, very toxic, toxic, harmful, corrosive, irritant, dangerous
for the environment, carcinogenic, teratogenic, or mutagenic). Id.
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example, the directive classifies a chemical as "dangerous for the
environment" if it "presents or may present immediate or delayed
risk. '124 Similarly, a chemical is classified as "harmful" if it "may
12 5
involve limited health risks" when inhaled or ingested.
In the early 1990s the European Community increased the
burden on parties wanting to manufacture or import new chemicals
by requiring, instead of merely encouraging, a risk assessment to be
performed. 126 The language of the new directive places even greater
emphasis on the value of precaution with respect to toxic chemicals.
For example, the introductory language states that a goal of the new
directive is to "protect man and the environment from potential risks
which could arise from the placing on the market of new
1 27
substances."'
2. Regulation of New Chemicals in the United States
In the United States, a new chemical is classified as one not
listed in the Toxic Substances Control Act Inventory (hereinafter,
TSCA Inventory). 2 8 Testing is not mandatory if a party wants to add
a new substance to the TSCA Inventory, but the EPA can require the
manufacturer to submit test data on the substance's effect on human
129
health and the environment if certain conditions are established.
To require testing, the EPA must first find that the substance "may
present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment"
or that it is produced in substantial quantities that may result in
130
significant environmental release or human exposure.
At first glance, TSCA and Directive 79/831/ECC appear to
embody a similarly precautionary approach, as both contain the
phrase "may present." However, although the EU directive qualifies
"may present" with the word "risk," TSCA qualifies "may present"
with the phrase "unreasonablerisk," suggesting it is more stringent
than its EU counterpart. 131 If the EPA does not make the findings
necessary to establish that a chemical poses an unreasonable risk, or

Id. art. 2(2)(k) (emphasis added).
124.
Id. art. 2(2)(h) (emphasis added).
125.
126.
Council Directive 92/32/EEC of 30 April 1992 Amending for the Seventh
Time 67/548/EEC, art. 3(2), 1992 O.J. (L 154) 1, 4 (effective Nov. 1993) (imposing a
mandatory testing requirement on new chemical substances to assess real or potential
risks).
127.
Id. at 1 (emphasis added).
128.
See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, New Chemicals and Existing
(last
Chemicals, available at http://www.epa.gov/oppt/newchems/newvexist.htm
updated Feb. 21, 2005) [hereinafter EPA, New Chemicals] ("Once on the Inventory, a
.
substance is considered an 'existing' chemical .
129.
15 U.S.C. § 2604(b) (2005).
130.
Id. § 2603(a)(1)(A)(i), (B)(i).
131.
See, e.g., id.; Council Directive 79/831/EEC, supra note 120, art. 2(2)(k), at
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the findings are not upheld by the courts, the manufacturer of a new
chemical substance is free to use, sell, and market a substance
without the submission of any data regarding its potential effects on
human health and the environment. 132 That is, not only does the U.S.
system lack a mandatory testing requirement, it also places the
initial burden of proof on the EPA-not the industry that stands to
profit from the introduction and use of a new chemical.
B. Regulation of Existing Chemicals
Chemical substances that are listed in either EINECS or the
TSCA Inventory are classified as existing chemicals. 134 With respect
to PBDEs, the most important differences between these systems are
the hurdles that each government must overcome before it can
are
restrict or ban the use of an existing chemical. These "hurdles"
135
significantly greater in the United States than in the EU.
1. Regulation of Existing Chemicals in the European Union
The current system for regulating existing chemicals within the
EU was established in 1993 when the Council of the European
Committees adopted the Existing Substances Regulation. 136 As with
the directive governing new chemicals, the influence of the
precautionary principle can be seen in this regulation. For example,
the Commission is directed to "regularly draw up lists of priority
substances or groups of substances (hereinafter referred to as priority
lists) requiring immediate attention because of their potential effects
on man or the environment.' 1 3 7 The directive does not require the
Commission to have conclusive evidence showing that a substance
causes harm before it can be placed on a priority list. 135 To the
is a factor that
contrary, a lack of data on the effects of the substance
1 39
supports placing a substance on a priority list.
Once a substance is placed on a priority list, a Member State
then bears the responsibility to oversee an extensive risk
assessment. 140 The Member State's delegated rapporteur has the

See 15 U.S.C. § 2603 (2005) (setting forth the limited situations in which
132.
EPA can require testing of a chemical substance before it is introduced to the market).
See infraPart IV.B.1-2.
134.
Compare infra Part W.B.1, with infra Part IV.B2.
135.
136.
Council Directive 793/93/EEC of 23 March 1993 Evaluation and Control of
the Risks of Existing Substances, 1993 O.J. (L 84) 1 [hereinafter Council Directive
793/93/EEC].
137 Id. art. 8, at 4 (emphasis added).
138 Id.
Id.
139.
Id. art. 10, at 5.
140.
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authority to require manufacturers and importers of the substance
under investigation to submit further data, conduct additional
testing, or both. 14 1 The rapporteur may not limit the risk assessment
to the known effects of the substance, as he or she is directed to
evaluate the evidence with respect to "the real or potential risk to
man and the environment."' 1 42 After the data has been collected and
evaluated, and any lack of data has been taken into consideration, the
rapporteur must characterize the risk by placing the chemical in one
of three categories. 143 The rapporteur's risk assessment is then
submitted to the Commission and a vote is taken on whether to adopt
the rapporteur's recommended risk reduction strategy. 144 If the
Commission approves a strategy that includes a restriction or ban,
the Commission will generally incorporate that restriction as an
amendment to Directive 76/769/EEC, which establishes restrictions
on the marketing and use of dangerous substances within the
145
European Community.
2. Regulation of Existing Chemicals in the United States
The authority of the EPA to restrict or ban the use of an existing
chemical in the United States is rooted in § 6 of the Toxic Substances
Control Act (TSCA).146 The EPA cannot restrict or ban an existing
chemical unless it can show that it "presents or will present an
unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment."'1 4 7 The
absence of the word "potential" from § 6 of TSCA, and the inclusion of
the phrase "presents or will present" and the word "unreasonable,"
restrain the United States from taking preventive or precautionary
action to the degree that the EU system allows.
Because the authority of the EPA is constrained by a statutory
requirement of unreasonable risk, any attempt to issue a rule under §
6 of TSCA must comply with the Administrative Procedure Act and is
subject to judicial review. 148 The availability of judicial review
provides ample opportunity for well-financed industrial groups to
challenge any EPA rule, and the unreasonable risk standard as

141.
Id.
142.
Id. (emphasis added).
143.
European Chemical Bureau, Existing Chemicals, supra note 119, at priority
setting § 5. One possible designation is "substance of concern, further risk reduction
measures, beyond those already in place, are required." Id.
Council Directive 793/93/EEC, supranote 135, art. 11, at 5.
144.
145.
See id. art. 11 (referring to Directive 76/769/EEC of 27 July 1976 on the
approximation of the laws, regulations, and administrative provisions of the Member
States relating to restrictions on the marketing and use of certain dangerous
substances and preparations, 1976 O.J. (L 262) 201).
146.
15 U.S.C. § 2605.
147.
Id. § 2605(a).
148.
Id.; 5 U.S.C. § 704.
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interpreted by the courts has proved to be exceedingly difficult to
meet. 14 9 Despite efforts to do so, the EPA has not successfully banned
a chemical using its § 6 authority in the more than twenty-five years
since TSCA was enacted. 150
The burden faced by the EPA under this system is exemplified by
Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA.1 1 In Corrosion Proof Fittings,
industry groups successfully challenged an EPA rule banning the
manufacture, import, and processing of nearly all products that
contained asbestos. 152 The Fifth Circuit held that the EPA did not
adequately consider alternatives to a ban, and that it was required to
1 53
calculate the costs and benefits of less burdensome alternatives.
CorrosionProof Fittings has been described as "the demise of section
6 of TSCA."'154 The EPA had proposed a § 6 ban on acrylamide and Nmethylacrylamide grouts before Corrosion ProofFittings was decided,
but the agency has taken no action on the proposal since the Fifth
Circuit's decision. 155 In fact, the EPA has not initiated any action
under § 6 since Corrosion Proof Fittings.156 Fuller and McGarity
describe the EPA's response as "entirely rational, if not courageous"
given the probability that industry groups will challenge any attempt
by the EPA to restrict or ban a chemical. 157 They further conclude
that "given the fact that the court was unwilling to allow the agency
to regulate even such a notorious bad actor as asbestos ... the agency
cannot be faulted for deciding that its limited resources are better
'
devoted to other activities. "158
C. Addressing the Problem of "Grandfathered"Chemicals
The differing procedural requirements for restricting or banning
the use of an existing chemical are particularly important for a major
problem faced by both the EU and U.S. systems: how to act with
regard to the so-called "grandfathered" chemicals. 15 9 The use of
chemicals in industrial processes was already widespread by the time
EINECS and the TSCA Inventory were established. 160 To
accommodate those industries, chemicals that were already in use
were placed into EINECS or the TSCA Inventory without being the

149.

See infra notes 151-56 and accompanying text on CorrosionProofFittings.

150.

LYNN L. BERGESON, TSCA: Toxic SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT 49 (2000).

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1229-30.
Id. at 1229; see Fuller & McGarity, supra note 85, at 27.
See Fuller & McGarity, supra note 85, at 26.
BERGESON, supra note 150, at 50.
Fuller & McGarity, supra note 85, at 28.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 39.

160.

See LUNDER & SHARP, supra note 7, at 38.
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subject to the regulatory requirements applicable to new
161
chemicals.
It is estimated that more than 150,000 chemicals, including
brominated flame retardants, were in use when the TSCA Inventory
and EINECS were created, and these chemicals were subsequently
left on the market without any consideration of their potential
hazards. 162 In the EU, approximately 100,000 chemicals used
between January 1, 1971 and September 18, 1981 were
grandfathered into EINECS. 163 In the United States, approximately
63,000 chemicals used between 1975 and 1977, the years immediately
surrounding TSCA's 1976 enactment, were grandfathered into the
TSCA Inventory. 16 4 Given the sheer volume of chemicals that were
grandfathered into the two systems, the state of knowledge about the
of industrial chemicals
potential risks posed by a significant number
1 65
has been described as "profoundly ignorant."'
The EPA acknowledges that this has led to situations in which
an existing chemical is not subject to any testing requirements even
though it may be of similar or greater toxicity than a new chemical
that would be subject to testing requirements if it were introduced for
the first time today. 166 The EPA also notes that the "lack of controls
on the older chemicals may cause a misunderstanding that, because
there are fewer (or no) requirements, they are considered safer than
the new, regulated chemicals."'1 67 The EPA is, however, working to
reduce this disparate treatment for existing chemicals. 168 Recognizing
that formal regulation of existing chemicals under TSCA has been
inefficient and difficult to implement, EPA's Existing Chemicals
Program is increasingly relying on the voluntary cooperation of
169
industries to implement risk-reducing measures.
EU Member States have expressed concern that, despite the
explicit incorporation of the precautionary principle into its toxic
chemical regulatory system, banning or restricting the use of existing
chemicals remains quite difficult. 170 The EU is addressing these
concerns and the problems of grandfathered chemicals with a

161.
Id.
162.
European Chemical Bureau, Existing Chemicals, supra note 119; LUNDER
& SHARP, supra note 7, at 38.
163.
European Chemical Bureau, Existing Chemicals, supra note 119.
EPA, New Chemicals, supranote 128.
164.
WWF, EU Toxics Briefing: An Introduction to REACH - a New Regulatory
165.
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proposed new regulatory system called REACH. 171 The European
Commission outlined the key components of REACH-registration,
evaluation, and authorization-in a paper released in early 2001.172
The REACH proposal continues the EU trends of emphasizing the
importance of precaution and increasing the burden on industries
that want to use chemicals and stand to profit from them. Under
REACH, industries are required to submit safety data for all
chemicals that they use to the government, and if the government
determines that the chemical is of "very high concern," it will be
phased out of use unless the industry can show its use presents
negligible risk. 17a REACH would retain the mandatory testing
requirement for new chemicals. In an attempt to address the problem
of grandfathered chemicals, it would also create a database
containing information on chemicals for which little to no data is
currently available. 174 All chemicals that meet the standards in the
Stockholm Convention for persistence, bioaccumulation, toxicity, and
long-range transport would automatically be characterized as
chemicals of very high concern and would be subject to a presumptive
phase-out unless the members of the industry wishing to use the
175
chemical satisfy a very high burden of proof.
If REACH is approved and implemented as planned, the
chemical regulatory systems in the EU and United States will become
even more polar. In the United States, the government will continue
to bear the burden of proving that a worrisome chemical poses an
unreasonable risk before its use or production can be restricted. In
contrast, industries in the EU will bear the burden of showing that a
worrisome chemical presents a negligible risk before its introduction
(for new chemicals) or continued use (for existing chemicals) is
authorized. The disparity between EU and U.S. environmental policy
appears to be increasing, as the U.S. government recently sent a
letter to the World Trade Organization outlining its opposition to
REACH. 176 The U.S. letter characterizes REACH as "particularly
costly, burdensome, and complex" and expresses concerns that it will
"prove unworkable in its implementation, disrupt global trade, and
' 177
adversely impact innovation."
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V. THE

EFFECT OF

EU AND U.S.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ON

PBDEs

Under both the EU and U.S. systems, PBDEs are classified as
existing chemicals and are among the chemicals that were
grandfathered into the two systems. While it is highly possible that
PBDEs will be added to the Stockholm Convention in the foreseeable
future, they are not currently covered by any international
agreement. Because no international agreement addresses the use of
PBDEs, any official restriction on their production or use must
originate domestically. While the European Union chose to issue
official restrictions, the United States has yet to do so at the federal
level.
A. Evidence of Effects
Research into the toxicity of potentially harmful chemicals is
necessarily limited by one obvious fact-it is impossible to
systematically study their effects without purposeful exposure.
Clearly no one would advocate purposeful human exposure to toxins
simply to gain a better understanding of them. As a result, the
evidence of the effects of a chemical is typically based on controlled
animal studies or accidental human exposure. 178 The validity of using
animal studies to draw conclusions about potential effects in humans
is widely accepted. 1 79 Because there is disagreement about precisely
how to relate animal findings to humans, however, researchers often
draw different conclusions about the magnitude of the threat to
human healthis ° As with most environmental toxins, research on the
health effects of PBDEs is primarily based on laboratory studies
involving animals. There is no direct evidence linking PBDEs to

adverse health effects in humans, but PBDE exposure in animals has
been linked to numerous adverse health effects.1s l In addition, there
is direct evidence linking a chemically similar group of fire
retardants, polybrominated biphenyls (PBBs), to human health
problems.i82

Like PBDEs, PBBs are manmade chemicals with flameretardant qualities that can be added to consumer products to make
them more difficult to burn. 8 3 Unlike PBDEs, however, there is
direct evidence linking PBBs to human health problems as a result of
accidental exposure. In 1973, approximately one thousand pounds of
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a brominated flame retardant named Firemaster, which consisted of
a mixture of PBBs, was accidentally mixed into the feed of dairy,
livestock, and poultry in Michigan.1 8 4 By the time the contamination
was discovered, approximately 10,000 people had been eating
contaminated animal products for several months.'8 5 Numerous
physical health problems were reported in association with the
exposure, including nausea, abdominal pain, loss of appetite, joint
pain, fatigue, and weakness.1 8 6 Many people also reported episodes of
amnesia and confusion.18 7 Children born to mothers exposed to
Firemaster in 1973-74 are reported to have decreased birth weights,
increased respiratory illnesses, and lower IQs.' 88 The monitoring of
people directly exposed to Firemaster, and their children, has
continued over the last thirty years in order to evaluate the
relationship between the accidental exposure and various health
problems, including breast cancer.1 8 9 The people affected by the
Firemaster contamination were obviously exposed to a very large
quantity of PBBs, much more so than average citizens who had
products in their homes containing PBBs. Nonetheless, concern over
PBBs was great enough that their use was discontinued in the United
States soon after the Michigan accident. 190 It was after PBBs were
removed from the fire retardant market that the manufacture and
use of PBDEs in fire retardants grew exponentially. 191 Fortunately,
there is no evidence linking PBDEs to adverse human health effects
because there has been no accidental exposure that parallels the
exposure of Michigan residents to PBBs. Unfortunately, some of the
laboratory studies conducted on PBDEs using animals indicate a
cause for concern.
Laboratory research into the possible toxic effects of brominated
flame retardants, and specifically PBDEs, began as a result of the
PBB accident in Michigan. 192 A recent review of the toxicology of
brominated flame retardants concluded that although the current
data are limited and sometimes contradictory, they do raise concern
over the safety of the continued use of some brominated flame
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retardants. 193 PBDE exposure in laboratory animals is linked to
various adverse health effects including behavioral changes and
learning, memory, and hearing problems, but most of the concern is
based on the potential effect of PBDEs on the thyroid gland and the
194
nervous system.
PBDEs have been shown to alter the levels of thyroid hormones
and harm the developing nervous system in animals. 195 In humans,
low levels of thyroid hormones (hypothyroidism) are associated with a
variety of health problems ranging from anxiety and depression to
fatigue and hair loss. 19 6 Pregnant women with particularly low levels
of one thyroid hormone have been reported to have children with
lower IQs. 197 Because pregnancy itself puts stress on the thyroid
gland, researchers are concerned that pregnant women (and their
unborn children) could be particularly vulnerable if PBDEs are
capable of lowering thyroid hormone levels in humans. 198 The data on
human exposure to brominated flame retardants is very limited, but
one study did find higher rates of hypothyroidism among people who
were exposed to brominated flame retardants while at work. 199
Based on the current research it is unclear whether PBDEs have
the ability to cause cancer. The EPA has classified one category of
PBDEs, Deca, as a possible human carcinogen. 20 0 This classification
of Deca is based on a 1986 study in which mice exposed to Deca
developed tumors of the liver, thyroid, and pancreas. 20 1 That study,
however, is the only one that has tested the PBDE mixtures used in
consumer products for their potential to cause cancer. 20 2 As a result,
the fact that only Deca has been classified as a possible human
carcinogen does not mean Penta and Octa are less worrisome than
Deca. Instead, it is quite possible that the lack of a carcinogen
classification is based on a lack of research. Future research could
theoretically show Penta and Octa are not carcinogens, but that
appears unlikely. To the contrary, some researchers believe Penta
and Octa are more likely to cause cancer than Deca based on an
20 3
analysis of the differences in their chemical structures.
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B. Evidence of Exposure
Although evidence of the effects of PBDEs is very limited, there
is more evidence tracking exposure levels in the EU than in the
United States. Studies evaluating human exposure to PBDEs usually
do so by measuring the levels of the chemicals in the breast milk of
mothers, and these studies have been conducted more frequently in
the EU. 20 4 Despite this evidential discrepancy, three trends have
been identified: exposure levels in the EU and United States both
rose quickly throughout the end of the twentieth century, levels in
the United States are much higher than in the EU, and levels in the
EU have begun to decline while levels in the United States continue
20 5
to rise.
In the most extensive long-term monitoring of human exposure
to PBDEs, Swedish researchers reported that the concentration of
PBDEs in breast milk increased by sixty times between 1972 and
1999.206 That rise corresponds to a doubling of PBDE concentration
every five years. 20 7 Similarly, Canadian researchers also reported
that PBDE levels increased by a high multiple between 1992 and
2002, but they found that the concentrations doubled in an even
20 8
shorter time span-2.6 years as compared to five years.
Comparable long-term, nationwide data about exposure in the United
States are not available, but measurements of women living in the
San Francisco area have shown a three-fold increase in PBDE levels
209
over the past thirty years.
PBDE exposure has seen an upward trend worldwide, but the
levels reported in the United States are by far the highest. For
example, the sixty-fold increase reported in Sweden represented a
rise in median PBDE concentration from 0.072 parts per billion (ppb)
to 4.01 ppb. 2 10 Similarly, the ten-fold increase reported in Canada
represented a median rise from 2 ppb to 25 ppb. 211 In contrast, three
recent studies in the United States have reported median PBDE
concentration levels of 34 ppb, 37 ppb, and 58 ppb. 212 Similar
204.
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205.
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differences among the countries are seen in the highest concentration
levels recorded: 7.7 ppb in Sweden, 590 ppb in Canada, and 1078 ppb
213
in the United States.
While levels in the United States have been on the rise, levels in
the EU have recently begun to decline, likely because of the voluntary
reductions that were already in place before the formal bans on Penta
and Octa were passed. 214 For example, Sweden reported mean PBDE
levels of approximately 4 ppb in the late 1990s, but that value had
decreased to 2 ppb by 2001.215
C. Making the Decision
Equipped with the same laboratory evidence regarding the
possible dangers of PBDEs and the widespread exposure to humans
(albeit at different levels), the governments of the European Union
and United States had to address the same issue-whether formal
restrictions on the production and use of PBDEs were necessary or
justified. Even though exposure levels in the EU were much lower
than in the United States, the EU answered that question in the
affirmative while the United States did not. Those differing answers
have led to much public debate about who is "right" and who is
"wrong."

VI. RESOLUTION: A MATTER

OF CHOICE, WITH LIMITS

The debate over whether or not PBDEs should be restricted or
banned is relatively new. Central to that debate, however, is an older
debate-the debate over the appropriate role of precaution in the face
of uncertainty. Scholars, politicians, and concerned citizens have
debated for years about what type of system is better: one that
one that requires proof of
permits action based on precaution 2or
16
identifiable risk before action is taken.
Supporters of a more precautionary approach argue vigorously
that the world should not wait until human health or the
environment actually suffer harm, much of which is irreversible,
before acting to minimize risk. 2 17 Supporters of a wait-and-see
approach, on the other hand, argue just as vigorously that action
unsupported by science is unjustified and causes the public to
overestimate risks from some sources and underestimate risk from
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others.2 18 It seems probable that one approach is not inherently
better than the other. Instead, there are advantages and
disadvantages to each. Frequently, an ounce of prevention really will
be worth a pound, and perhaps much more, of cure. Sometimes,
however, fears about the unknown may be reduced upon learning,
after further investigation, that the unknown is not as dangerous as
initially feared. As a result, it seems that the better question is not
which approach is per se better than the other, but rather which
approach reflects the concerns and values of the people who must
decide whether to act now or wait until more is known, and who will
benefit from or bear the costs of that decision.
A. Choice and PoliticalAccountability
In general, decisions regarding whether to endorse the
precautionary principle and take protective action or wait before
there is a clearer understanding of precisely what a given risk entails
should be left to the citizens and government of each independent,
sovereign country. In the end, deciding when precaution is
worthwhile and when to take restrictive action is a policy decision.
These decisions are typically made by elected government officials
who are directly accountable to their constituents or by government
representatives who, although not directly elected, remain politically
accountable through elected government officials. These officials can
be voted out by the citizens if they disagree with the approach the
officials have taken. Presumably, EU environmental policy endorses
the precautionary principle because that approach reflects the
concerns, priorities, and will of the majority voting population. If
concerned citizens in the United States decide that their government
is unnecessarily exposing them to risk by not acting early enough,
they can voice that disagreement on election day. If those concerns
become dominant, U.S. environmental policy will become more
precautionary to appropriately reflect the will of the majority.
The power of each country to make these policy-based decisions
should not be unlimited, however. This power should be limited in
situations in which postponing restrictive action allows a country to
internalize the benefits of delay but externalize some of the costs to
the citizens and the environments of foreign countries. That is the
situation created by the use of POPs, including PBDEs. One of the
four defining characteristics of POPs is their susceptibility to longrange transport. 2 19 As a result, far less than 100 percent of the
PBDEs released in the United States will remain within the United
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States. 220 This situation creates the same cost-benefit problem
observed in numerous aspects of human behavior: the United States
is able to internalize all of the benefits associated with the continued
use of a chemical (typically increased revenue from industry), but
externalize some of the costs (in the form of harm to the environment
and public health of foreign countries). Citizens of the EU, Canada, or
Mexico who are harmed by the U.S.'s release of POPs, including
PBDEs, have no political recourse against the U.S. government.
Because of the unusual 6haracteristics of this situation, the
United States should align its environmental policy with the
prevalent standards of the international community by explicitly
incorporating the precautionary principle into its regulation of POPs.
In other areas of environmental policy, the United States internalizes
all of the costs of its decision-making. For example, citizens in Europe
would have difficulty making a compelling argument that they are
harmed by the level of pollution in an isolated lake in the Midwest. In
that situation, the United States should have full autonomy to act
cautiously and reduce the pollution, or defer acting until more is
known about whether the pollution level is harmful to human health
or the environment. If local residents believe action should be taken
to reduce pollution, they can voice their disapproval and, if necessary,
elect new representatives.
B. POPs:Aligning U.S. Policy with the InternationalCommunity
The United States cannot effectively align its POPs policy with
the rest of the international community without revising TSCA and
ratifying and implementing the Stockholm Convention in its entirety.
The difficult burden created by § 6 of TSCA, which requires the EPA
to prove that a chemical poses an "unreasonable risk" before
restrictive action can be taken, has been routinely criticized. 22 1 The
Corrosion Proof Fittings court did not interpret TSCA as requiring
undisputed proof of inevitable harm, but the numerous findings
required by the court nonetheless are much more burdensome than
any test envisioned by the articulation of the precautionary principle
in the Rio Declaration. 222 The EPA has effectively used tools besides
TSCA to protect human health and the environment from toxic
chemicals, as demonstrated by its recent negotiations with Great
Lakes Chemical for the voluntarily stoppage of the production of
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Penta and Octa. 223 The risks posed by PBDEs, however, are far from
eliminated. The EU ban prohibits not only the production of Penta
and Octa but also the sale of any products containing those
chemicals. 224 In contrast, although Great Lakes has agreed to stop
producing Penta and Octa, there is no federal law prohibiting the use
of Penta and Octa or the sale of goods containing them.2 25 As a result,
U.S. manufacturers remain free to import Penta and Octa for use in
their production processes or import goods that already contain Penta
and Octa and sell them to the 1ublic, subject to the bans in
California, Maine, and New York.
In addition, Great Lakes Chemical also manufactures Deca,
which is not included in the voluntary phaseout.22 6 This omission is
disconcerting for two reasons. First, Deca is by far the most widely
used of the PBDEs, comprising eighty-three percent of the global
market by weight.2 27 Second, recent studies indicate Deca breaks
down in the environment into the smaller congeners that are "the
very chemicals being banned in Europe and California. '22 8 The EPA
could theoretically negotiate a similar agreement with Great Lakes
Chemical in the future to stop its production of Deca. The negotiating
position of the EPA, however, is significantly weakened by the
common knowledge within industry that "unless Congress amends
TSCA... it can safely be predicted that EPA will never take another
action under section 6 (Regulation of hazardous chemical substances)
over the objection of the affected industry."22 9 Consequently, unless
TSCA is amended to give the EPA the realistic option of using its § 6
authority to ban an existing chemical, the United States will be
unable to take precautionary action unless the affected industry
supports the change. Presumably, any industries involved would
strongly resist such changes as businesses would not be using a
particular chemical in the first place unless it was profitable.
In order to respect the decision of the international community to
regulate POPs on a more precautionary basis, the United States also
needs to ratify and implement the Stockholm Convention in its
entirety. As noted earlier, the most recent proposed legislation only
addresses U.S. regulation of pesticides, not industrial chemicals such
as brominated flame retardants that may be added to the
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Convention. 23 0 The Stockholm Convention, although precautionary in
nature, contains numerous procedural safeguards to ensure that any
23
decision to list a new substance is supported by scientific evidence. '
Canada and Mexico have both ratified the Convention and are
therefore bound by its terms.23 2 Part of the costs to human health and
the environment that will result from the U.S.'s ongoing delay to
ratify the Stockholm Convention will be borne by Canada and Mexico
because of their proximity to the United States. As such it will not be
surprising if those two nations pressure the United States to ratify
the Convention and commit to a precautionary approach to the
regulation of POPs.

VII. CONCLUSION

The recent action by the European Union to ban formally the use
of PBDEs, and the lack of similar action in the United States, has
renewed the debate over the appropriate course of action in the face
of scientific uncertainty. Arguments in favor of a precautionary
approach and arguments in favor of waiting until more is understood
both have merit. These decisions require the evaluation and
prioritization of numerous factors. With regard to PBDEs, those
factors include weighing the benefits of fire protection against the
potential harm to human health and the environment that may result
from their continued use.
There is no universal and inherent "right" answer to these
questions. Instead, these difficult decisions should be made by each
country in response to the will of the people who will share the
benefits of, and bear the costs of, these decisions. But when a portion
of these costs will be borne by large groups of individuals who have no
say in the decision-making process, governments should also be
responsive to those individuals' concerns.
Large sections of the international community have indicated
their commitment to the precautionary principle in the regulation of
POPs through formal restrictions on PBDEs and ratification of the
Stockholm Convention. Because of the externalities caused by the
production and use of PBDEs, foreign citizens and environments bear
part of the costs of continued production and use of PBDEs by the
United States. Consequently, the United States should respect the
will of the international community by expressly incorporating the
precautionary principle into its policy regarding POPs, including
PBDEs. In order to do so, however, the United States needs to
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decrease the hurdles created by § 6 of TSCA in the regulation of
existing chemicals and ratify and implement the Stockholm
Convention in its entirety.
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